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Abstract
This paper studies how donations respond to unexpected permanent changes
in income and tax rates in a recursive dynamic model. The dynamic approach
yields several interesting insights. If marginal tax rates are progressive, a per-
manent jump in a household’s income increases its consumption and donations
in the short run, but has no eﬀect in the long run. The permanent income
elasticity of current donations is likely to exceed one. If the marginal tax rate
is ﬂat, the jump in income raises consumption and donations in both the short
and the long run. A permanent marginal tax rate cut raises consumption and
donations in the long run if marginal tax rates are progressive, while it reduces
donations in the short run if it has little direct impact on tax payments. If the
marginal tax rate is ﬂat, a tax cut has a positive eﬀect on consumption in both
the short and the long run, but has an ambiguous eﬀect on donations.
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Donations are a major source of revenue for charitable organizations and have at-
tracted a great deal of attention in the economic literature. Numerous empirical
studies have been devoted to estimating the elasticities of donations with respect to
changes in both income and the tax price (for tax-deductible donations, the tax price,
commonly deﬁned as one minus the marginal tax rate, moves in the opposite direction
to the change in the tax rate). This research has been accompanied by progress in the
theoretical analysis of charitable giving behavior.1 As stated in Feldstein and Clotfel-
ter (1976), one of the main motivations of these studies is to provide parameters for
evaluating the impact on donations of various proposals for changes in tax policy.
Most early studies carried out only reduced-form estimations of the determination
of charitable contributions using cross-section data, with their speciﬁcations building
on static models. Since the nature of cross-section data makes it diﬃcult to untangle
the eﬀects of permanent vs. transitory changes, recent studies have turned to panel
data, using multi-period dynamic models for their theoretical guidance. For exam-
ple, Randolph (1995) used a two-period life cycle model and derived the short-run
responses of donations to permanent and temporary changes in income and in the
tax system. To capture a household’s expectations of future changes in income and
in tax policy, Auten et al. (2002) used a standard recursive model with an inﬁnite
planning horizon and derived optimal conditions from this framework.
However, an important question regarding the theoretical analysis of donations
remains unexplored: is there any diﬀerence between the short-run and the long-run
responses of donations? In particular, is the response of donations to a permanent in-
1come or price shock only a temporary deviation from its current state or a permanent
switch to a new long-run state?
A key task in exploring these issues is to capture the fact that a household can
respond to changes in its income and in the tax system by adjusting savings at the
m a r g i ni no r d e rt ob e s ta l l o c a t ei t si n c o m eacross periods within its entire planning
horizon. When saving changes, so do planned expenditures on consumption and
donations. For instance, if a household faces a permanent reduction in the tax rate,
a static model predicts that the household will cut its donations due to the increase
in the price of donations. However, in a dynamic model, the tax reduction raises
households’ incentive to save via increasing the after tax rate of return to saving,
which then increases households’ lifetime wealth. As a result, donations could rise
in the long-run after a permanent tax cut in a dynamic model.
The pressing need for a dynamic model to deal with the issues at hand also arises
from the fact that it is very diﬃcult to explain the large price and income elasticities
for donations in a static model. For example, Auten et al. (2002) found that the short-
run elasticity of donations with respect to a persistent change in the tax price lies
between -0.31 and -2.13; Randolph (1995) documented that the short-run elasticity
of donations with respect to a permanent change in income ranges from 1.14 to 1.69.2
A static model can hardly reconcile the large values of the elasticity with the U.S. tax
system. With realistic progressivity in the marginal tax rate, the income elasticity
of donations at a level of 1.69 in a single-period model would imply that, following
a rise in income, a household would substantially reduce the fraction of its income
spent on private consumption. This implication is inconsistent with the conventional
2view on consumption behavior vs. permanent income change. But a dynamic model
with many periods would show a household responding to a permanent rise in income
through reducing savings, since with the increased income, it would face a higher
marginal tax rate and hence a lower rate of return on savings. When saving falls as a
result of increased income, a household can spend more on both private consumption
and donations in the short run.
Exploring these questions theoretically can give charitable organizations better
tools to assess the impact of tax reform on donations. It can also help resolve the
debate on the sign and magnitude of the short-run elasticity of donations, in particular
shedding light on the question of whethera n yi m p o r t a n tf a c t o ri sm i s s i n gi nt h e
estimation speciﬁcation. Ultimately, it can help predict the long-run elasticity of
donations.
Our purpose in this paper is to examine the eﬀects of unexpected permanent
changes in income and in the tax price on charitable giving in a recursive dynamic
framework. We will explicitly analyze these eﬀects in both the short run and the
long run. Given the fact that Auten et al. (2002) found that donations are rather
inelastic to temporary changes in income and in the tax system, we will ignore these
temporary changes in the analysis.3
The recursive dynamic approach yields several interesting results when the marginal
tax rates are progressive. First, a permanent rise in a household’s income reduces
its asset holding, but has no eﬀect on its consumption and donations in the long
run. However, in the short run, the levels of both consumption and donations rise
i nr e s p o n s et ot h ei n c o m ei n c r e a s ew h e nt he reduced amount of saving further adds
3to short-run expenditures. The elasticityo fd o n a t i o n sw i t hr e s p e c tt oap e r m a n e n t
income change in the short run is likely to exceed unity, resulting from a combination
of increases in short-run expenditures and reductions in the tax price of donations.
Second, in the long run, a permanent marginal tax-rate cut raises consumption and
wealth. While the tax cut also raises donations in the long run, it reduces donations
in the short run if it has little direct impact on tax payments that arises from the tax
code change for any given amount of disposable income. Last but not least, because
ﬂuctuations in saving are negatively correlated with changes in tax payments but
positively correlated with variations in the tax price of donations, failing to control
for the ﬂuctuations in savings levels could introduce an upward bias to the estimate
of price elasticity and a downward bias to the estimate of income elasticity.
If the marginal tax rate is ﬂat, our model predictions on how wealth responds
to a change in income or taxes are less clear since there is only one particular value
of the ﬂat tax rate that can lead to a steady state for a household in the long run.
However, we can still show that a permanent rise in income increases consumption
and donations in both the short and the long run. This is because the relative price of
donations is constant under the ﬂat tax system, a permanent rise in income only works
through the income eﬀect. A permanent tax cut has a positive eﬀect on consumption
but an ambiguous eﬀect on donations in both the short and the long run, because a
tax cut raises not only disposable income but also the relative price of donations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the model.
Section 3 focuses on the response of donations to a permanent change in income, and
Section 4 on the response of donations to a permanent change in the tax system.
4Section 5 provides a numerical illustration of our model predictions. The last section
provides some concluding remarks.
2. The model
Although there are many possible causes for donations as discussed in Andreoni
(2006), we focus on the “warm-glow” theory in which donors derive utility directly
from their acts of giving. By doing this, we abstract from the public goods aspect
of donations, which has been analyzed in, e.g., Bergstrom et al. (1986), Steinberg
(1987), Andreoni (1989), Glazer and Konrad (1996), and Harbaugh (1998). This
public goods aspect would entail strategic behavior on the part of both households
and the government and thus would complicate a recursive model greatly. Moreover,
Andreoni (2006) shows that the “warm-glow” model is most suitable for analyzing
the amount of donations. As in Auten et al. (2002), in our model agents allocate
their disposable income between private consumption Ct and donations Gt over an





s−tU(Cs,G s), 0 < β < 1, (1)
where β is the discounting factor and Et the expectation at time t. We adopt the
standard regularities of U: it is twice diﬀerentiable, increasing in all elements, and
strictly concave, with U1 > 0, U2 > 0, U11 < 0, U22 < 0a n dU11U22 − U2
12 > 0.
We also assume that U12 ≥ 0, an approach that assumes private consumption and
donations to be complementary for their competing uses of income. This assumption
is stronger than what we need to prove Propositions 1 and 2 in the next section. We
maintain this assumption just for the sake of continuity as it is commonly assumed in
5the donation literature. It should be noted that we implicitly rule out the possibility
of bequests to children as a normal good by using an inﬁnitely lived agent model.4
The intertemporal budget constraint of households is given by
Ct + Gt + Wt+1 = Wt(1 + rt)+Yt − Tt(rtWt + Yt − Gt), (2)
where Wt is the amount of wealth at t, Yt is earnings, rt the interest rate, and Tt the
tax as a function of income net of donations. Following the literature on donations,
we treat r and Y as exogenously given.5 Adopting this assumption helps us compare
the results of the recursive model with those of the conventional static model; it also
keeps the model manageable. Finally, the present value of households’ assets at the
end of their planning horizon is restricted to zero (i.e. the transversality condition):
lim
t→∞
Wt/[1 + r(1 − τ)]
t =0 . (3)
The problem of a household is to solve the following concave programming:




where (2) is used to substitute out Ct.










This condition balances the gain in utility from making an additional unit of donations
against the loss in utility from reducing private consumption by the same unit. It
is valid regardless of the time line on which the decision is based (whether a single
6period or an inﬁnite horizon). The derivative T   stands for the marginal tax rate at
a particular level of taxable income, denoted Y T
t ≡ rtWt + Yt − Gt.T h u s , 1 − T 
is the tax price of charitable giving. The tax price appears on the left-hand side
alongside the marginal utility derived from private consumption but is absent from
the right-hand side of the equation because donations are tax deductible but private
consumption is not. Note that, when the marginal tax rate T   changes as a result of
either a change in income or a change in the tax system, the tax price 1−T   changes
in the opposite direction, tending to alter private consumption and donations.






This condition governs the intertemporal allocation of resources in a typical fashion:
the loss in utility via giving up one more unit of private consumption today for saving
is compensated by a gain in utility through building up more future assets.






[1 + rt(1 − T
 
t)], (7)
which indicates the contribution to utility that results from increasing wealth at the
margin. According to (7), this contribution can be measured by the marginal utility
derived from spending the increased wealth, plus its interest income net of taxes, on









[1 + rt+1(1 − T
 
t+1)]. (8)
7In this equation, a change in the marginal tax rate T  resulting from either a change
in income or a change in the tax system will alter the after-tax rate of return on
saving, tending to alter the paths of saving, donations, and private consumption.
In the next two sections, we consider how donations respond to unexpected per-
manent changes in income and in the tax system, respectively. Since the problem at
hand with a recursive structure and with a general utility function has no reduced-
form solution, we attempt instead to characterize key features of household responses
to these changes in both the long run and the short run. To simplify our analysis,
w ea s s u m et h es a m el e v e lo fe a r n i n g sY in all periods after an initial change, and
t h es a m ei n t e r e s tr a t er in all periods. With these assumptions, in the long run, the
implicit solution of the concave programming under 0 < β < 1 becomes stationary
when the marginal tax rate T  (Y T) is adjustable to taxable income Y T,w h i c hw i l l
become clear later. Thus, we drop the time subscripts associated with C,G,T,T ,
and W in the above equations. Speciﬁcally, the long-run stationary versions of (2),
(5), and (8) are given below:
C = rW + Y − T(rW + Y − G) − G, (9)
(1 − T
 )U1 = U2, where U1 ≡ ∂U/∂C, U2 ≡ ∂U/∂G, (10)
1=β[1 + r(1 − T
 )]. (11)
We are now ready to analyze the responses of donations to changes in income and in
the tax system. We begin with the former.
83. A permanent change in income
Diﬀerentiating equations (9)—(11) with respect to Y , we derive the following results:
Proposition 1. (a) For T   > 0, 0 <T   < 1,a n dU12 ≥ 0,ap e r m a n e n tr i s ei nY has
no long-run eﬀects on consumption C and donations G but has a negative long-run
eﬀect on wealth W. However, it has positive short-run eﬀects on consumption and
donations through reducing saving if 1/r ≥− W 
t. (b) For T    =0 , 0 <T   < 1,a n d
U12 ≥ 0,ap e r m a n e n tr i s ei nY has positive eﬀects on consumption C and donations
G in all periods t ≥ 0.
Proof. Part (a). Diﬀerentiating (11) with respect to Y gives
0=−βrT
   × (rW
  +1− G
 ). (12)
Since T    > 0 with progressive taxes, we must have
rW
  +1− G
  =0 . (13)
Diﬀerentiating (9) with respect to Y and using (13), for 0 <T   < 1w eo b t a i n
C
  = rW
  +1− T
 (rW
  +1− G
 ) − G
  =0 . (14)
Diﬀerentiating (10) with respect to Y and using C  = 0 in (14), we have
G
 [U12(1 − T
 ) − U22]=0 . (15)
If U12 ≥ 0( s u ﬃcient but not necessary), then G  = 0 under 0 <T   < 1a n dU22 < 0.
Finally, using the fact that rW  +1− G  = 0 in (13) and G  =0a b o v e ,w ea l s oh a v e
W  = −1/r < 0.
9The long-run responses of W, C,a n dG imply that saving, measured by Wt+1−Wt,
should fall in the short run. First, suppose that saving starts to fall in the initial period
(time 0) when a household realizes a permanent rise in income. Given a predetermined
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0 − W 
1) − T   
0 U1(0)W 
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0)U12(0) − (1 − T 







[U12(0) − (1 − T 
0)U11(0)](1 − T  
0 − W 
1)+T   
0 U1(0)
2(1 − T  
0)U12(0) − (1 − T  
0)2U11(0) − U22(0) + T   
0 U1(0)
. (17)
Clearly, for W 
1 < 0a n dU12 ≥ 0, together with T    > 0, 0 <T   < 1, Ui > 0, and
Uii < 0( i =1 ,2), we have C 
0 > 0a n dG 
0 > 0.
Now, suppose that savings start to fall for ∞ >t>0, i.e., W 
t+1 − W 
t < 0.
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2(1 − T  
t)U12 − U22 − (1 − T 
t)2U11 + T  
t U1
. (19)
For U12 ≥ 0, T  
t > 0a n d0<T  
t < 1, it is clear that C 
t > 0a n dG 
t > 0 under
W 
t+1 − W  
t < 0a n d1 /r ≥− W 
t (or equivalently 1 + W 
tr ≥ 0.)
Part (b). See the proof in the Appendix. -
It is worth mentioning that part (b) of Proposition 1 still holds when the tax
function becomes T(Y T)=τY T − e where e is a positive parameter. In this case,
10while the marginal tax rate is still ﬂat, the average tax rate becomes an increasing
function of taxable income Y T. This suggests that a permanent change in household
income can aﬀect donations in the long run even under a progressive tax system.
In short, whether changes in household income can aﬀect donations in the long run
depends on whether the marginal, rather than the average, tax rates are progressive.
M o r e o v e r ,w ee x c l u d et h ec a s ew i t hT   < 0 (i.e. a regressive tax system) for two
reasons. First, a regressive tax system is of little practical relevance in the real world.
Second, under this system disposable income becomes a convex function of taxable
income Y T and hence the optimization problem is not well deﬁned. Speciﬁcally, there
will be a steady state with T     = 0 but in the steady state the feasible set of (C,G)
satisfying the steady-state budget constraint (9), i.e. C<Y T − T(Y T), is no longer
a convex set with T   < 0. This is because the steady-state budget constraint line is
featured by C = Y T − T(Y T), dC/dG = −(1 − T ) < 0a n dd2C/d2G = −T    > 0
under T   < 0. Graphically, the steady-state budget constraint line is bent toward the
origin like an indiﬀerence curve.
According to the existing empirical literature, most individuals should face a pro-
gressive tax system. For example, Akhand and Liu (2002) show that, except for
households at the bottom quartile of the income distribution, the eﬀective marginal
tax rate almost always increases with income. However, for individuals who have
already facing the highest marginal tax rate, they are likely to face a ﬂat tax sched-
ule. The restriction U12 ≥ 0, is far more restrictive than what is necessary for the
derivation of our results. Even if U12 < 0, both C and G increase in the short-run as
long as U12 > max{(1 − T )U11,(1 − T  )U22}.6 Lastly, the range of change in wealth
111/r ≥− W 
t that can lead to the ideal result merely means that the change in wealth
in any single period does not exceed the needed change in the long run.
The positive short-run responses of private consumption and donations to per-
manent income changes are in line with the typical empirical evidence found in the
literature. What is most intriguing about our ﬁndings is the following. Permanent
r i s e si ni n c o m eh a v en oe ﬀect on private consumption and donations in the long run,
but raise both of them in the short run under a progressive tax system. The expla-
nation for the diﬀerence between the short-run and the long-run eﬀects lies in the
progressive nature of the tax system.
However, in a dynamic model that includes a progressive tax system, the after-tax
rate of return to saving r(1 − T  
t+1) in (8) falls as income increases in all periods–
unlike earlier static models. The falling after-tax rate of return to saving implies that
the marginal rate of substitution between consumption in the current period and the
next should fall accordingly to maintain the balance in that equation. Thus, under
progressive taxes a household realizing a permanent rise in income will increase its
level of consumption in the current period relative to the level of consumption in
the next period by reducing saving.7 Following this argument, the level of current
consumption in a household should be greater than the level of its consumption in a
more distant future, if the decline in wealth continues. Thus, when the fall in wealth
eventually equals the rise in income as seen in (13), long-run consumption need not
respond to a permanent income rise in (14). According to (11), the rise in the tax rate
resulting from the permanent increase in income will be fully oﬀset by the fall in the
tax rate via the reduction in wealth in any long-run stationary solution. Consequently,
12the tax price of donations will eventually climb back to its original level. Therefore,
the implied relationship between private consumption and donations in (5) suggests
that donations, like consumption, need not respond to permanent income changes in
the long run.
Like in a static model, in our dynamic model a progressive tax system diﬀeren-
tiates among the degrees of the responses of private consumption and donations to
a permanent income change, because donations are tax deductible. From (5), when
income rises permanently, the tax price of donations 1 − T  
t falls, and so does the
marginal rate of substitution between donations and private consumption. In order
for this marginal rate of substitution to fall for a given household, it needs to in-
crease its donations by a higher percentage than its consumption as a response to the
increased income.
Putting the above discussions together leads us to an important implication of
Proposition 1 for the short-run elasticity of donations with respect to permanent
income changes. On the one hand, the amount reduced from saving adds to the rise
in income for a further increase in spending on private consumption and donations
in the short run. On the other hand, the increased short-run spending tends to
favor increasing donations against private consumption as the tax price falls. The
combination of these two forces enhances the possibility for the permanent-income
elasticity of donations to be greater than 1 in the short run. This ﬁnding contrasts
sharply with the conventional view based on a static model, which focuses only on
the decline in the tax price without considering the reduction in savings.
To see the implication for the size of the permanent-income elasticity of donations
13in the short run more speciﬁcally, let us start from a static model with a ﬂat-rate tax.
By setting β = 0, we reduce our model to a one-period static model. In this version
there is no saving, thus the optimal decision is characterized by (5) and a special case
of (2) with wealth W = 0. Correspondingly, the response of donations to a rise in
income in (19) becomes
G
  =
[U12 − (1 − T )U11](1 − T )+T   U1
2(1 − T  )U12 − (1 − T  )2U11 − U22 + T  U1
. (20)
In this static model, if the utility function is log and the tax rate is constant, then
the income elasticity of donations would be equal to 1; if the tax is progressive, then
the elasticity should exceed 1.8 Using a progressive tax function regarded by Gouveia
and Strauss (1994) as representing the U.S. data very closely, we ﬁnd that the income
elasticity of donations in the static model do e si n d e e de x c e e du n i t y .F i n a l l y ,s i n c et h e
short-run response of donations to a permanent change in income G 
t is greater in a
dynamic model than the response G  in a static model because of changes in savings,
the chance for the income elasticity of donations to exceed 1 is even greater in the
former than in the latter. A larger-than-one permanent income elasticity of donations
in the short run is consistent with the empirical ﬁnding in Randolph (1995).
4. A permanent change in the tax system
To facilitate the analysis of the eﬀects of tax reform on donations, let us introduce
a transformation of the tax function F(Y T,θ), where Y T = rW + Y − G represents







+ F2, 0 <F 1 ≡
∂F












T,θ)|θ=0 = T(rW + Y − G). (23)
By construction, F1 in (21) is the marginal tax rate, which increases with the tax
parameter θ and is a nondecreasing function of disposable income Y T in (22). Also,
when θ increases, the overall change in the tax payment of a household in (21) has two
components: the direct one, F2 for the relevant given amount of disposable income,
a n da ni n d i r e c to n e ,F1∂Y T/∂θ which results from the change in disposable income
Y T (and the corresponding change in donations). Note that since F2 = F2(Y T,θ)i s
a function of disposable income in general, it is not necessarily lump sum. Further,
at θ = 0, the transformation function F is the same as the original tax function as
seen in (23). In this setting, a reduction in the marginal income tax rate through tax
reform can be viewed as a fall in θ.
Diﬀerentiating equations (9)—(11) with respect to θ, we establish the following
results:
Proposition 2. (a) For T    > 0, 0 <T   < 1,a n dU12 ≥ 0, a permanent cut in the
marginal tax rate raises long-run consumption C, donations G,a n dw e a l t hW.I n
the short run, however, G can fall following such a tax cut if the direct impact on
tax payments of the tax cut is small. (b) For T   =0 , 0 <T   < 1,a n dU12 ≥ 0,a
15permanent cut in the marginal tax rate raises consumption C, but has an ambiguous
eﬀect on donations G.
Proof. Part (a). Let us ﬁr s tc o n s i d e rt h ec a s ew h e nT   > 0. Diﬀerentiating (11)
with respect to θ gives
0=−βr[F11(Y
T,θ) × (rW
  − G
 )+F12(Y
T,θ)]. (24)
Because F11|θ=0 = T    > 0 under the progressive tax system, and F12 > 0, we have
F11(Y
T,θ) × (rW
  − G
 )+F12(Y
T,θ)=0 , (25)
and rW  − G  < 0. Diﬀerentiating (9) with respect to θ yields
C
  = rW
  − F1(Y
T,θ) × (rW
  − G
 ) − F2(Y
T,θ) − G
 . (26)
When θ =0 ,F1 = T   and C  c a nb es i g n e db y
C
  =( 1− T
 ) × (rW
  − G
 ) − F2|θ=0 < 0, (27)
since 0 <T   < 1, rW  − G  < 0, and F2 > 0.









Equations (25), (27), and (28) imply that
G
  =
U12 − (1 − T )U11




T    + F2|θ=0]. (29)
As long as T    > 0, 0 <T   < 1, and U12 ≥ 0, we have G  < 0, and W  <G  /r < 0.
16To examine the short-run reaction of donations, let us look into the initial period
with a predetermined level of initial wealth W0.D i ﬀerentiating (2) and (5) in time 0



















(F2 + W 




0)U12(0)−T   
0 U1(0)+U22(0)
, (31)
where all Fi and Fij are evaluated at θ =0a n dt = 0. Here, the sign of C 
0 is not
known in general. However, for W 
1 < 0, T    > 0, 0 <T   < 1, and U12 ≥ 0, we have
G 
0 > 0i fF2 is suﬃciently small.
Part (b). See the derivations in the Appendix. -
Proposition 2 implies that while a reduction in the marginal income tax rate is
likely to reduce donations in the short-run, it raises both private consumption and
donations in the long run. Our model implications are consistent with the facts
documented in Figure 1 of Andreoni (2006). Andreoni shows that donations as a
percentage of personal income jumped in 1986 right before the tax cut in 1987 and
then fell considerably in 1987. It kept falling till 1996 and climbed steadily up to
2001.
According to (8), which concerns saving behavior, the tax cut increases the after-
tax rate of return to saving r(1 − T  
t+1). To regain the balance of this equation,
the marginal rate of substitution between current and future consumption has to
increase accordingly. Consequently, a household facing a tax cut will increase its
future consumption relative to current consumption through increasing saving. Hence,
17consumption increases over time after a tax cut.
Less intuitive is the long-run increase in donations following the tax cut. As
s h o w ni ne q u a t i o n( 5 ) ,t h et a xc u tm a k e sd onations more expensive compared with
consumption, as in a static model. Hence, the increase in after-tax income resulting
from the tax cut does not necessarily lead to a net increase in donations. The two
conditions that are essential for the long-run response of donations to the tax cut to
be positive are equation (11) and a progressive tax system–i.e., one in which the
marginal tax rate increases as households accumulate more assets. Given β and r,
in the long run the rise in the marginal tax rate driven by the increase in W will
eventually cancel out the fall in the margina li n c o m et a xr a t ec a u s e db yt h et a xc u t .
As a result, the tax cut alters neither the marginal tax rate paid by the household nor
the relative price of donations in the long run. Because households accumulate more
assets in the new steady state, both consumption and donations increase in the long
run. The implied relationship between tax cut and asset accumulation is consistent
with the vast majority of the existing literature on taxation and savings surveyed by
Bernheim (2002), Boadway and Wildasin (1994) and Kotlikoﬀ (1984). Intuitively, as
shown by equation (8), the agent will shift resources from period t to period t +1i f
he expects the tax rate will decrease in t + 1. As a result, saving increases in t.
The positive long-run response of donations to a tax-rate cut appears to be in-
consistent with the strong negative price elasticity of donations found by the existing
empirical studies. We suggest this is because donations respond diﬀerently in the
short run than in the long run, and the empirical studies can only document the
short-run response. Proposition 2 suggests that donations could indeed decline in the
18short run following the tax cut if the direct impact on tax payments of the tax cut
is small in the case of revenue-neutral tax reform. As revenue neutrality is usually
an important dimension in tax-reform proposals, the prediction in Proposition 2 that
donations will decline right after marginal tax rate cuts may turn out to be important
in practice. Let us use as an example the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which is said to
be roughly revenue neutral by Ballentine (1992). Auten et al. (1992, Table 3) show
that, on average, the fraction of household after-tax income donated to charitable
organizations was 3.5% in 1986, fell to 3.3% in 1987, and fell further to 3.2% in 1988.
The 1987 level was recovered in 1990.
The prediction that household wealth will increase following a tax-rate cut is also
supported by data from the U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES). Approxi-
mately, the average value of household assets increased by 18%, from $14,308 (in
current dollars) in 1986 to $16,894 in 1987.9 During the same period, the nominal
average household annual income increased by only 7%, from $25,460 to $27,326.
In contrast to the dynamic model used here, in a static model, households cannot
adjust their asset holdings. By setting W 





F2[U12(0) − (1 − T 
0)U11(0)] − F12|θ=0U1
(1 − T 
0)2U11 − 2(1 − T 
0)U12 − T   
0 U1 + U22
. (32)
Respectively, F2 and F12 are the direct impact on the tax payments and the change
in the marginal tax rate due to tax reform; thus, the ﬁrst part of the numerator of
equation (32) represents the response of donations to the direct impact of tax reform
on tax payments, and the second part reﬂects the response of donations to the change
in the tax rate itself. This equation is comparable with Randolph’s (1995) equation
19(12), which decomposes the net elasticity of donations with respect to a permanent
proportional change in all marginal tax rates into two parts: the permanent price
elasticity and the permanent income elasticity. If the price elasticity dominates, then
donations will decrease after a tax cut. Conversely, if the income eﬀect through the
change in the tax payment dominates, donations will increase.
However, a comparison between equations (31) and (32) indicates that in a dy-
namic model, the impact of changes in tax payments is mitigated by the opposite
movement in savings. Therefore, a tax-rate cut is more likely to generate a short-run
decline in donations in a dynamic model than to reduce donations in a static model.
Because W  is negatively correlated with F2 but positively correlated with −T  
0,t h i s
observation suggests that the price elasticity could be overestimated while the income
elasticity underestimated in a model that does not control for variations in savings
W .
Finally, if the tax rate is ﬂat, a permanent decline in it raises consumption but has
an ambiguous eﬀect on donations. This is because the income eﬀect and price eﬀect
of the tax cut are of the same positive sign for consumption, but they are of opposite
signs for donations. In addition, there is no general tendency for any diﬀerence in the
responses between the short run and the long run. These results are very diﬀerent
from those under a progressive tax system.
5. Numerical examples
While the results in the case with a ﬂat tax rate is simple, the results in the case
with a progressive tax are complicated because of the diﬀerent patterns of responses
20between the short run and the long run. In this section we provide numerical examples
to illustrate how households respond to an unexpected permanent income rise as well
as to a tax cut over the entire equilibrium path with a progressive tax. In order
to do so, let us assume a simple log utility function Ut = αlnCt +( 1− α)lnGt







t )−ρ+s]−1/ρ. In this tax function, Y
T ≡ rW+Y −G refers to taxable income
while b, s and ρ are positive constants. According to the estimates in Gouveia and
Strauss (1994, Table 1, p. 323), we choose the following benchmark parameterization
for the tax function: b =0 .479, s =0 .022 and ρ =0 .817. The parameterization of the
preferences is assumed to be: α =0 .9a n dβ =0 .9753. Also, we choose a benchmark
level of the exogenous income Y =1 5( t h eu n i ti si n$ , 0 0 0 )a n dac o n s t a n ti n t e r e s t
rate r = 3%. The steady state solution to the benchmark case is C =1 2 .98239394858,
G =1 .70873674193 and W =3 4 .21657257798. We focus on small numbers in the
examples for ease of computation.
Since the number of equations characterizing the solution of the entire path in
the recursive model is inﬁnitely large, various methods of approximation have been
used in the literature for numerical solutions in such models. Our method has the
following features. First, assume that the solution to the household problem takes n
periods to reach the steady state and solve the system of equations in the n periods
simultaneously. We then consider n +1p e r i o d sa n dc o m p a r et h ew e l f a r eg a i no v e r
the n−period solution. We stop the process if the welfare gain, measured by the
equivalent amount of consumption added to each period, is less than 1/10,000 in
units of consumption.
21We consider two cases of changes. The ﬁrst case is a change of exogenous income
Y from 15 to 15.15, or a one percent rise. The second case is a tax cut by reducing
b and ρ to new levels 0.47895 and 0.81695 (we have veriﬁed these changes indeed
cause the marginal tax rate to fall given the parameterizations we use). The changes
are assumed to be small in order to make computation manageable because larger
changes will take many more periods to adjust (too many to handle on a personal
computer). Before each change, we assume that the household initial wealth starts
from the benchmark steady state level. We then compute for the transition process
toward the new steady state after each change.
The results are plotted in Figures 1 and 2. In Figure 1, we report the transition
from an income rise to the new steady state in more than 40 periods. In response to
t h ei n c o m er i s e ,t h el e v e l so fc o n s u m p t i o nand donations rise initially and eventually
fall to the same steady state levels while the level of wealth declines monotonically
to its new steady state level. In particular, the income elasticity of donations is
found to be over 1.4 for the ﬁrst ten periods in this simulation. The numerical
results are consistent with our analytical results in Section 3. In Figure 2, we report
the transition from a tax cut to the new steady state. In response to the tax cut,
the levels of consumption and donations fall initially and eventually rise to higher
levels in the new steady state while the level of wealth rises monotonically to its new
steady state. The numerical results in Figure 2 are also consistent with our analytical
results. Notice that, when wealth falls (rises) in the transition, there is dissaving
(saving) corresponding to higher (lower) levels of consumption and donations.
226. Concluding remarks
Feldstein and Clotfelter (1976, p.25) state that “the key empirical question is the
extent to which alternative tax treatments would aﬀect the volume and distribution
of charitable contributions.” Clearly, this question cannot be fully answered purely
by empirical analysis if we are interested in both the short-run and long-run eﬀects
on donations of changes in the marginal income tax rate and in incomes, because
the long-run eﬀects are not observable. For many observers, a tax cut that only
temporarily reduces donations deﬁnitely causes less concern than one that leads to a
permanent decrease.
In this paper, we have used a recursive dynamic model to analyze theoretically
the long-run and short-run responses of donations to permanent changes in income
and in tax rates. The novel contribution of this analysis to the economic literature
on donations is that the responses for the long run and the short run are remarkably
diﬀerent. The key factor behind this diﬀerence is the fact that permanent changes in
i n c o m ea n di nt a xr a t e sa l s oa ﬀect saving behavior, which moves household expendi-
tures across periods. Our analysis shows that, while donations can be very responsive
to changes in permanent income in the short run as the empirical literature suggested,
over time, they return to their original level. Moreover, although donations may fall
following a permanent tax-rate cut in the short run, as suggested by existing em-
pirical studies in the literature, they will eventually rise beyond their original level.
The policy implication of this result should b e ,t os o m ee x t e n t ,ar e l i e ft oc h a r i t a b l e
organizations when it comes to assessing their potential revenues following tax-cut
reforms.
23Appendix
Part (b), Proof of Proposition 1.W i t hT   (·) = 0, for simplicity, let us assume
T(Y T)=τY T and hence T  ≡ τ where Y T refers to taxable income. It is important to
note that with T    =0t h e r ei so n l yo n ev a l u eo ft h et a xr a t eτ that can be consistent
with a steady state 1 = β[1+r(1−τ)] according to (11). We thus need to incorporate
the transversality condition in (3) so as to prevent wealth from running away from
ﬁnite values in the absence of steady states. Deﬁne R ≡ R(τ)=1+r(1 − τ) > 1
for notational ease. Making successive substitutions on the budget constraint (2) and
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The ﬁrst-order conditions are βtU1(t)=λ/Rt(τ)a n dβtU2(t)=λ(1 − τ)/Rt(τ),
leading to the optimal conditions (1 − τ)U1(t)=U2(t)a n dU1(t)/U1(t +1 )=βR(τ)
paralleling those in (5) and (8). Diﬀerentiating these optimal conditions and the
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Equation (A.35) states that C 
t and G 
t should share the same sign for all t ≥ 0g i v e n
that Uii < 0a n dU12 ≥ 0. Combining this statement with (A.37), it follows that the
present value of the overall spending on consumption and donations must be positive








U11(t +1 ) U22(t +1 )− U2
12(t +1 )





12 > 0 is part of the assumption that U(C,G) is strictly concave,
and that the denominators on both sides must have the same sign. It thus implies that
G 
t and G 
t+1 and hence all G s in every period t ≥ 0 must have the same sign. Clearly,
this result applies to C s in all periods too since sign(C )=s i g n ( G ). Combining all
arguments together, C 
t > 0a n dG 
t > 0f o ra l lt ≥ 0. -
Part (b), Proof of Proposition 2. Now, let us consider the case when T    =0 .W e
make the same assumption about the tax function as we did in part (b) in the proof
of Proposition 1. Diﬀerentiating the optimal conditions and the constraint (A.33)
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Substituting it back into (A.41) and using Y T




















2(1 − τ)U12(t) − U22(t) − (1 − τ)2U11(t)
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While the right-hand side of (A.44) is negative, the right-hand side of (A.43) is am-
biguous. Also note that the coeﬃcients on C  and G  in the left-hand sides of these
two equations are positive. Thus, a tax cut raises consumption but has ambiguous
eﬀects on donations, when considering all time periods together. Also, from (A.40),
the signs of C 
t, G 
t, C 
t+1 and G 
t+1 may or may not be the same, unlike in the case of
a permanent income change.
The results in Propositions 1 and 2 are derived with the assumption U12 ≥ 0. How-
ever, even if U12 < 0, the results will still remain valid, provided that the magnitude
of U12 is relatively small compared to that of Uii. -
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29Footnotes
∗ We would like to thank three anonymous referees for their valuable comments.
1. Andreoni (2006) and Clotfelter (2002) provide excellent summaries on the cur-
rent state of the literature, including an extensive set of up-to-date references.
2. There is no consensus in the literature on the sizes of these elasticities, however.
These studies use the U.S. tax return data for less than 20 years and the dif-
ference in the reported estimates of the elasticities may stem mainly from how
the estimation is speciﬁed.
3. In their ﬁnding, the elasticities of donations to temporary changes in income
and in the tax price are far below unity. It is not surprising that a model
w i t ha ni n ﬁnite horizon and with a concave utility function shows an inelastic
response of donations to such temporary changes. This is because it is optimal
for households to spread temporary gains or losses in household resources over
many periods through saving or dissaving.
4. However, the recursive model we use here may also be interpreted as an overlapping-
generations model whereby agents live one period in childhood and one period in
adulthood and are connected by parental altruism in a dynastic family. Accord-
ingly, one may interpret savings in the inﬁnitely lived agent model as bequests
parents give to their children in the dynastic, overlapping generations model.
The results in this paper will be the same regardless of whether we assume
inﬁnitely-lived agents or overlapping generations of two-period lived agents in
dynastic families.
305. The tax return data used in the related empirical studies are micro in nature,
containing information on income and donations across households and across
years. Our treatment of the household problem is carried out with this feature
of data in the literature in mind.
6. Clearly, we cannot rule out the possibility that U12 takes a value that leads to
C
I
t< 0a n dG
I
t< 0. Providing a reasonable value for U12 is beyond the scope of
this paper and worth further empirical investigations.
7. This result is similar to the negative eﬀect of the RRSPs on saving found by
Ragan (1994) under a progressive tax system. According to him, a tax delay
by the RRSPs generates both a substitution eﬀe c ta n da ni n c o m ee ﬀect. Under
a progressive income tax system, the substitution eﬀect on saving is negative
in his model. With the tax delay, individuals may also expect a rise in after-
t a xl i f e t i m ei n c o m ea n dh e n c ec o n s u m em o r ea n ds a v el e s s . M o r e o v e r ,u n d e r
a progressive tax system, the increase in permanent income will increase the
agent’s eﬀective tax rate. Our model’s prediction on savings is also broadly
consistent with the existing studies on the impact of taxation on savings as
surveyed by Boadway and Wildasin (1994) and Bernheim (2002).
8. Suppose that U = αlnC +( 1− α)lnG. Equation (20) then becomes
G
  =
(1 − α)(1 − T  )+αT  G
1 − T   + αT   G
≥ 1 − α with T
   ≥ 0.
Also, suppose that T    =0a n dT  = τ where τ is a constant. Then, the
simpliﬁed budget constraint C =( Y − G)(1 − τ)a n dt h eﬁrst-order condition
31(5) would imply G/Y =( 1− α)a n dC/Y = α(1 − τ). Combining these with
the above expression for G ,w eﬁnd that the income elasticities of consumption
and donations are both equal to unity: G Y/G = C Y/C =1 . W i t hT   > 0
in the above expression for G , however, the income elasticity of donations is
greater than 1, i.e. G Y/G>1, so long as G/Y is close to 1 − α.
9. Because the CES does not give the average value of household assets, we ap-
proximate it by dividing incomes from assets (including interest, dividend, and
renting) by the annual federal fund rate of the year. Speciﬁcally, the nominal
values of average incomes from assets are $973 in 1986 and $1115 in 1987, and
the corresponding federal fund rates are 6.80% and 6.66%. However, the CES
does give the year-to-year net changes in household assets, $1,195 in 1986 and
$3,122 in 1987, which also suggest that households accumulated more wealth
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(c) The transition path for wealth
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(c) The transition path for wealth
Figure 2: Transition from a tax cut
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